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Inequality, credit and financial crises
Cristiano Perugini, Jens Hölscher and Simon Collie*
In the three decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008/09, income inequal-
ity rose across much of the developed world. This has led to a vigorous debate as to 
whether widening inequality was somehow to blame for the crisis by driving private 
sector credit booms. Despite growing interest, empirical evidence on an inequality–
fragility relationship is limited. Based on a panel analysis of 18 OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries for the years 1970–2007, 
this study provides evidence of a positive relationship between income concentration 
and private sector indebtedness, once other traditional drivers are controlled for. If 
confirmed, the implications of this result are as follows: (i) the view that the distribu-
tion of income is irrelevant to macroeconomic stability, as implicit in mainstream 
approaches, needs further investigation; and (ii) in order to make the financial system 
more robust, policy makers should cast the net wider than monetary policy and regu-
latory reforms and consider the effects of changes to distributive patterns.
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1. Introduction
In the three decades leading up to the financial crisis of 2008/09, economic inequality 
rose across much of the developed world (Atkinson et al., 2011; OECD, 2011). This rise 
was nowhere more pronounced than in the USA—the country at the epicentre of the 
crisis—where, by the mid-2000s, income concentration reached magnitudes not seen 
since the period immediately preceding the Great Depression. Against this backdrop, 
a lively debate has re-emerged as to whether inequality may play, directly or indirectly, 
some destabilising role in the economy.
Central to this debate is the question of whether high or widening inequality con-
tributes to the excessive accumulation of debt, which in turn is widely recognised as 
being the ultimate driver behind episodes of financial instability. The latter notion can be 
traced back to Fisher (1932, 1933), who argued that ‘all great booms and depressions’ 
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are ultimately caused by two dominant factors, ‘namely, over indebtedness to start with 
and deflation following soon after’ (Fisher, 1933, p. 341). Building on this view, Minsky 
(1975, 1982, 1986) placed rising debt at the heart of his financial instability hypothesis, 
although admittedly his focus was on corporate debt and investment, rather than house-
hold debt and consumption. He argued that an inherent feature of capitalist economies 
is the propensity for the financial system to swing between periods of extreme robustness 
and extreme fragility. Paradoxically, it is the environment of economic prosperity and 
stability itself that shows the seeds of the ensuing financial collapse. During prosper-
ous times, when corporate incomes are high, a speculative euphoria develops and lend-
ing surpasses what borrowers can possibly repay from future incoming cash flows. The 
eventual result is widespread default, shortly followed by a liquidity crisis and asset price 
deflation. Lending contracts sharply and even those businesses that are creditworthy are 
denied access to finance, leading to a contraction in the real economy.
Kindleberger (1978) tells a similar story, in which a benign economic environment 
creates a sense of optimism for the future. As a result, asset prices rise, leading to yet 
further optimism. Key to this narrative is investors’ use of credit to gain increased expo-
sure to rising asset prices, driving prices up further. A self-reinforcing mania develops 
and profit expectations depart significantly from their fundamental potential, and all 
the while debt-to-income ratios rise and capital ratios fall. The crisis reveals itself when 
something occurs to expose the true extent of this overoptimism and a panic ensues. 
Asset prices crash as investors rush to liquidate their positions at the same time.
A substantial body of empirical research, mostly developed in the last decade, has 
confirmed that episodes of financial instability are indeed precipitated by excessive lev-
els of debt in some form or another (see, e.g., Borio and White, 2003; Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008; Elekdag and Wu, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Schularick and 
Taylor, 2012).
Accordingly, the investigation of the roots of financial instability needs to focus on 
the drivers of credit/debt expansion. The existing body of theories (for a review see 
Mendoza and Terrones, 2008) provides explanations related to the following: herd 
behaviour by banks (Kindleberger, 1978); information problems that lead to bank-
interdependent lending policies (Rajan, 1994); the underestimation of risks (Borio 
et al., 2001) and the loosening of lending standards (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006); 
the presence of government guarantees (Corsetti et  al., 1999); limited commitment 
on the part of borrowers (Lorenzoni, 2005); and business cycles and financial accel-
erators (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). On the empirical 
side, the factors established as being key drivers of credit expansion include deregula-
tion of the financial system (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Rancière et  al., 2006); accommodative monetary policy (Borio and 
White, 2003; Elekdag and Wu, 2011; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008); rapid economic 
growth (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008); and inflows of foreign capital (Elekdag and Wu, 
2011; Decressin and Terrones, 2011). The key question that this paper seeks to address 
is whether the redistribution of income should also be added to this list.
Despite growing interest and theoretical debate on the inequality–credit–crisis 
relationship (see Section 2), the empirical research is still limited. The purpose of 
this paper is to add to this scarce evidence with an empirical model derived from 
a critical discussion of the existing literature. We are able to present the results of 
an econometric analysis for a panel of 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) developed economies over the period 1970–2007, which 
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shows a statistically significant, direct, positive relationship between income concen-
tration and private sector indebtedness when controlling for other traditional, struc-
tural credit determinants. In the same sample, growing private sector indebtedness is 
shown, as a preliminary exercise, to increase the probability of a financial crisis.
The contribution of the paper to existing knowledge is twofold. On the conceptual 
side, besides providing a thorough review and discussion of the existing literature on the 
topic, we provide an organised view of the channels through which widening inequality 
can favour credit expansion. On the empirical side, we complement the only cross-
country evidence so far available—see Bordo and Meissner (2012) (hereafter Bordo 
and Meissner, 2012) which is our main empirical inspiration and which concluded for 
the inexistence of an inequality–credit nexus. By using a somewhat different approach, 
which we regard preferable in many respects, we reach the opposite conclusion, hence 
showing that their evidence cannot be considered as conclusive. In particular, we depart 
from this reference work regarding the following: (i) the choice of the measure of credit 
(a broader, more inclusive metric); (ii) the estimation of the model in levels rather 
than in changes; (iii) the explicit consideration of the threats posed by endogeneity and 
reverse causation issues; (iv) the explicit consideration of the institutional drivers of 
credit expansion (financial markets deregulation); and (v) the consequent restriction 
of the time span of the analysis to the last four decades, but with the addition of four 
countries. Our more limited time coverage is, however, not to be regarded as a major 
drawback, since it corresponds to the period in which credit started to remarkably 
decouple from broad money as a result of increased leverage and augmented funding 
via the non-monetary liabilities of banks. A period in which most developed economies 
entered an age of unprecedented financial innovation, risk and leverage, which eventu-
ally undermined their stability (Schularick and Taylor, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on inequality, credit and financial fragility and provides the conceptual background on 
which our empirical model relies. Section 3 describes the data, provides some prelimi-
nary descriptive evidence and presents the methodology and the findings of the econo-
metric model. Section 4 concludes.
2. Inequality, indebtedness and crisis: theoretical explanations and 
empirical evidence
A vast literature exists that seeks to determine the sources of observed changes in the 
income distribution over the last four decades and a comprehensive review of this litera-
ture is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, what follows in the next few paragraphs 
is a brief summary of some of the key themes to provide the reader with a rudimentary 
context for subsequent discussion.
Increasing trends of inequality have been explained by changes in taxation that 
reduced progressivity of the tax schedule at the top of the distribution (see, e.g., Atkinson 
et al., 2011), globalisation and technical change that increased relative skill premia (see, 
e.g., Van Reenen, 2011). Other labour market arguments include the spread of per-
formance-related pay (Lemieux, 2006; Lemieux et al., 2009), changing labour market 
institutions such as the decline of unionisation and minimum wages (Card et al., 2004; 
Card and Di Nardo, 2002) and the rise of superstars (Rosen, 1981). Overall, these the-
ories conclude for low-wage positions being associated with low-skilled or low-educated 
workers and higher earnings to the highly educated/skilled labour supply. In particular, 
Page 4 of 31  C. Perugini, J. Hölscher and S. Collie
the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis has complemented the predictions 
of the human capital (Becker, 1964) and the signalling/screening (Spence, 1974; Weiss, 
1995) theories, by maintaining that the introduction of new technologies and the conse-
quent organisational innovation would increase relative demand for skilled (in the sense 
of educated) workers, pushing their relative returns upwards (Autor and Katz, 1999).
In a similar demand/supply framework, others blame globalisation (for a review 
see Chusseau et al., 2008). In a standard neoclassical Stolper–Samuelson framework, 
trade with countries with lower ratios of high-skilled to low-skilled workers increases 
the demand for high-skilled labour, thus pushing up the skill premium. Similar conse-
quences are predicted by the new trade theories (see, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996), 
in which outsourcing patterns increase the relative demand of skilled labour, and hence 
wage inequality, in both origin and destination countries. Trade theories developed in the 
framework of the new economic geography contribute to explain inequality within coun-
tries due to specialisation patterns driven by the existence of agglomeration economies, 
which originate well-known core–periphery patterns (see Fallah and Partridge, 2006; 
Fujita et al., 1999). Lastly, in the recent literature on firm heterogeneity and international 
trade, and despite theoretical models based on uniformity of wages (Melitz, 2008), the 
empirical evidence shows that internationalised firms tend to have higher productivity 
and pay higher wages (see Serti et al., 2010; Castellani et al., 2010). This contributes to 
explain the observed within-industry variability in wages.
The limited capacity of these theories to explain observed inequality and labour mar-
ket patterns, particularly job polarisation (Goos and Manning, 2007), has led to a more 
nuanced formulation of the SBTC theory. The main explanation relies on the so-called 
routinisation hypothesis (Autor et al., 2003): only routine manual and cognitive tasks, 
placed at the middle of the wage distribution, can be easily replaced by computers. As 
a consequence, routine workers will worsen their wage position both relative to abstract 
workers and to elementary non-routine occupations.
Finally, somehow as an antithesis for the preceding explanations, Galbraith (2007, 
2012) argues that observed income inequality trends are so similar across countries and 
over time that they cannot be accurately explained by micro, country-specific factors. 
Instead Galbraith suggests that within-country (and between-country) income inequal-
ity trends have been driven largely by macro, global forces, which all countries respond 
to—he cites changes to the global financial architecture, including the deregulation and 
globalisation of finance, as the primary cause.
The notion that inequality may be linked to economic instability is not new. Writing 
on the causes of the Great Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, Marriner 
Eccles, chairman of the Federal Reserve during that period, argued that:
a giant suction pump had by 1929–1930 drawn into a few hands an increasing portion of cur-
rently produced wealth. This served them as capital accumulations. But by taking purchasing 
power out of the hands of mass consumers, the savers denied themselves the kind of effective 
demand for their products that would justify a reinvestment of their capital accumulations in new 
plants. In consequence, as in a poker game where the chips were concentrated in fewer and fewer 
hands, the other fellows could stay in the game only by borrowing. When their credit ran out, the 
game stopped. (Eccles, 1951, p. 76, cited in Reich, 2010)
John K. Galbraith (1992 [1954], p. 97) argued in similar vein, highlighting the ‘bad 
distribution of income’ as being the first of ‘five weaknesses [that] seem to have had an 
especially intimate bearing on the ensuing disaster’.
Following the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008–09, interest in this notion has 
been rekindled, with a number of analyses suggesting that widening inequality may have 
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played a key role in the recent crisis. These include a number of popular books (see, e.g., 
Rajan, 2010; Reich, 2010; Galbraith, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Palley, 2012), policy-focused 
papers (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 2009; IMF–ILO, 2010; Krueger, 2012) and opinion editorials 
penned by prominent economic commentators (see, e.g., Milanovic, 2009; Wade, 2010; 
Roubini, 2011). In addition to these contributions there is also a small (but growing) 
body of academic research that has attempted to more formally analyse the relation-
ship empirically and theoretically (see, e.g., Atkinson and Morelli, 2010, 2011; Kumhof 
and Rancière, 2010; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011; Kumhof et al., 2012; Tridico, 2012; 
Bordo and Meissner, 2012; Van Treek, 2014).
Rajan’s book Fault Lines (Rajan, 2010) contributed much of the momentum to the 
current debate. He argues that rising inequality in the USA pressured governments 
of all political persuasions to enact policies aimed at improving the situation of those 
low- and middle-income voters being left behind. However, in the polarised world of 
American politics, the usual recourse of governments—the redistribution of income via 
taxes and social spending—was politically toxic. Instead successive governments chose 
to placate those voters by enacting policies that would expand their access to credit, 
such as deregulation of credit markets and encouraging of state-owned mortgage agen-
cies to expand lending to low-income households. This created a glut of credit, which 
households obligingly guzzled as a substitute for rising incomes as they sought to attain 
the standard of living they had come to expect. The resulting credit bubble laid the 
foundations for the subsequent crisis.
Acemoglu (2011) suggests that this explanation may misinterpret the true cause–
effect relationship. He posits an alternative hypothesis whereby it was politics that drove 
both inequality and the financial crisis. There is concomitance, not causation. Citing 
evidence from Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2005), Acemoglu argues that the policies over 
the period in question were in fact more closely aligned to the preferences of a minor-
ity of high-income voters; instead of redistributive policies favouring low- and middle-
income constituents, politicians implemented financial deregulation policies favouring 
influential high-income constituents (many of whom worked in, or directly benefited 
from, the financial sector). Yet Acemoglu does not link rising income concentrations to 
increased political influence amongst the affluent, despite this being a central tenet of 
Bartels’s study (Bartels, 2008) (on which his argument is founded). With the addition of 
this component, inequality may once more be seen to lead to increased financial instabil-
ity through a feedback process: (i) rising inequality leads to increased political influence 
amongst the wealthy; (ii) this is used to promote policies of financial market deregula-
tion; (iii) this leads to both financial instability and rising inequality; and back to (i). The 
possibility of higher income concentrations affording those at the top of the distribution 
greater political influence with which to promote policies of financial deregulation in 
the pursuit of personal interest is something explored by Krugman (2012). The key dif-
ference between Acemoglu’s hypothesis and Rajan’s hypothesis, then, is the tail of the 
distribution from which deregulatory pressure comes.
The above narratives are specific to the US social and political context. Others sug-
gest that a relationship between income inequality and financial instability may apply 
more generally across countries. In a far-reaching study on the nature and causes of 
income inequality drawing on the University of  Texas Income Project dataset, Galbraith 
(2012) finds that income inequality and financial fragility rose in tandem across the 
developed world from the 1970s onwards, as a result of changes in the global financial 
architecture. He suggests that the two are related in some cause–effect way, noting that 
‘the link, of course, runs through debt’ (Galbraith, 2012, p. 3).
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In the spirit of Kalecki (1942) and Kaldor (1955), Stiglitz (2009 2012) and Fitoussi 
and Saraceno (2010 2011) argue that rising income inequality in the run-up to the cri-
sis redistributed income from households with a high propensity to consume to those 
with a low propensity to consume, weighing on consumption expenditure and suppress-
ing aggregate demand. The policy response from modern inflation/output-targeting 
central banks was to loosen monetary conditions to support demand. This propped up 
consumption for a while, but it could not go on forever; private sector debt eventually 
reached unsustainable levels and the credit bubble burst. Adding strength to this under-
consumption argument is the empirical evidence on the positive relationship between 
relative income and the marginal propensity to save (see, e.g., Dynan et al., 2004).
All preceding explanations are political economy ones, in the sense that, in certain 
institutional settings, high levels of inequality provoke a political or monetary response, 
which is then responsible for the expansion of credit, the excessive build up of debt 
and the corresponding financial instability. Although intellectually appealing, these 
approaches appear of limited explanatory power, since policy actions are always the 
outcome of a convergence of economic, political and social forces; reducing them to be 
primarily driven by inequality patterns seems therefore an oversimplification.
An alternative view is that a more direct link between inequality and indebtedness 
(and hence risk of crisis) exists, i.e. one that does not rely on specific institutional/policy 
arrangements and so holds in a more general sense. Taking a more formal approach 
than those discussed above, Kumhof and Rancière (2010) develop a closed-economy 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which a financial crisis is the endog-
enous result of rising income inequality. They take as stylised facts the correlation 
between rising income inequality and credit growth in the USA, in both the periods 
preceding the 1929 market crash and in the run-up to the recent financial crisis. When 
the model is calibrated to US data, simulations show how increased income inequality 
can endogenously lead to credit growth, higher leverage and increased probability of 
a financial crisis. The model has at its heart two classes of economic agent: investors 
(defined as the top 5% of earners) who own all of the capital, earn only capital income 
and save and invest as well as consume; and workers (everyone else) who earn only 
wage income and use this only for consumption. A key assumption is that workers have 
some minimal consumption level that they must attain, which is a function of some pre-
viously attained level of consumption, and that they will turn to credit markets (which 
are assumed to be perfect) if necessary in order to attain this. When a shock reduces 
the bargaining power of workers relative to investors, the workers, faced with declining 
real wage growth, borrow in order maintain their desired level of consumption. On the 
other side of the transaction, investors lend to the workers out of their rising incomes 
via financial intermediaries, which they own. As inequality increases, workers become 
increasingly indebted to investors, who amass claims on them. The saving and borrow-
ing behaviour of these two groups leads to increased demand for financial intermedia-
tion and the size of the financial sector grows in relation to the rest of the economy. All 
the while, leverage of the household and financial sector increases, thus increasing the 
probability of a financial crisis. A key feature of this model is that consumption inequal-
ity rises much more slowly than income inequality due to the substitution of loans for 
income at the bottom of the distribution. This is consistent with documented trends 
concerning the relative evolution of income and consumption inequalities in the USA 
and elsewhere in the run-up to the recent crisis (e.g. for the USA see Krueger and Perri, 
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2006; for the UK see Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; for Canada see Brzozowski et al., 
2010; and for Italy see Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2009).
Such a transmission mechanism, from increasing income concentration at the top 
of the distribution to increased availability of household credit, is also proposed by 
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010, 2011) and Milanovic (2009). The latter argues that ris-
ing inequality in the USA led to vast accumulations of wealth at the top of the income 
distribution, which led to a glut of funds seeking profitable investment. The financial 
sector, overwhelmed by the volume of funds seeking investment relative to profitable 
opportunities in the productive sector, became increasingly more inventive and reck-
less, ‘basically throwing money at anyone who would take it’ (Milanovic, 2010, p. 194).
On the demand side, higher inequality causes worse-off agents to borrow more in 
order to maintain consumption expenditure as their income falls. This finding is con-
sistent with previous USA-based studies on the relationship between income inequality 
and household debt by Iacoviello (2008), Blundell et al. (2008) and Krueger and Perri 
(2006).
However a key point of contention is the extent to which observed increases in meas-
ured income inequality reflect widening dispersion of permanent income or of transi-
tory income, since only the latter should lead to higher borrowing in the context of 
permanent-income and life-cycle theories (Friedman, 1957; Modigliani and Brumberg, 
1954). Yet in Kumhof and Rancière’s model (2010), households at the bottom of the 
income distribution borrow to maintain consumption after a shock affects the distribu-
tion of permanent income. What is more, empirical evidence suggests that the rise in 
inequality observed in recent decades was driven overwhelmingly by increased disper-
sion in permanent income (see, e.g., Kopczuk et al., 2010; Debacker et al., 2013).
Van Treek (2014, p. 10) argues that in order to properly understand the effects of 
the distribution of permanent income on consumption and savings decisions, the per-
manent-income hypothesis must be abandoned in favour of the lesser-known relative 
income hypothesis, originally formulated by Duesenberry (1949). This hypothesis pos-
its that a household’s consumption expenditure in a given period is a function of some 
previously attained maximum level of consumption expenditure and of the consump-
tion expenditure of reference households. The latter channel is emphasised by Frank 
et al. (2010), who build a theoretical model of consumer behaviour with the concept of 
relativity of consumption at its very foundations. They argue that rising inequality leads 
to expenditure cascades, ‘whereby increased expenditure by some people leads others 
just below them on the income scale to spend more as well, in turn leading others just 
below the second group to spend more, and so on’ (Frank et al. 2010, p. 5). In support 
of this hypothesis, they present empirical evidence of a positive relationship between the 
level of income inequality and financial distress in the 100 most densely populated US 
counties. Similarly, Bertrand and Morse (2013) find that the consumption expenditure 
and income of rich households within each US state is a significant predictor of the 
consumption expenditure of non-rich households within that state, holding the income 
of those middle-income households constant.
Whilst theoretical explanations of an inequality–crisis relationship abound, empiri-
cal evidence on the relationship is limited. Kumhof et al. (2012) build on Kumhof and 
Rancière (2010) by opening up the model to the international sector. Calibrating the 
model to UK data, simulations show that increased inequality endogenously leads to 
credit expansion, increased leverage and increased current account deficits, which in 
turn increase the probability of a systemic financial crisis. As a complement to this 
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theoretical model, Kumhof and coauthors also conduct an econometric analysis using 
a panel of 18 OECD countries over the period 1968–2006. They find that income 
concentration (measured by the top 1% and top 5% income shares) is a statistically 
significant predictor of external deficits through the channels just described.
Using data from 25 countries over the period 1911–2010, Atkinson and Morelli 
(2010, 2011) look for patterns of rising inequality in advance of ‘systemic’ banking 
crises. Consistent with Rajan’s hypothesis, they find significant increases in income ine-
quality in the USA prior to both the 1929 crash and the recent financial crisis. However 
they find that this pattern is far from universal. They also stress that their methodol-
ogy focuses solely on changes in inequality and so is silent about the effect of levels of 
inequality on financial fragility, an avenue they highlight for further research and which 
we follow here.
Another study that contests the universality of a link between income inequality and 
crises is that of Bordo and Meissner (2012). Based on a panel of 14 mainly advanced 
countries from 1920 to 2008, they first find a statistically significant, positive relation-
ship between credit growth and the occurrence of a financial crisis. In the second stage 
of their research, they investigate econometrically the link between changes in the top 
1% income share and changes in annual bank lending, finding no statistically significant 
relationship between the two. On this basis they reject what they call the ‘RKR’ (Rajan, 
Kumhof and Rancière) hypothesis, in favour of the more traditional determinants of 
credit growth and crises.
3. Inequality, deregulation and credit: empirical analysis
The variety of possible interpretative frameworks just summarised suggests different reasons 
underpinning the cause–effect relations between inequality, policy variables, indebtedness 
and the outburst of a crisis. Consistent with the most general explanations of the inequal-
ity–credit growth link, our objective here is to look for empirical evidence on the existence 
of a direct relationship between income inequality and the size of credit once other possible 
drivers, including deregulation of financial markets, are accounted for. Our approach shares 
many similarities with Bordo and Meissner’s (2012) study; however, it significantly departs 
from it in terms of methodology, time/country coverage and variables used.
Our research objective poses several issues on both the empirical side and the econo-
metric side. First of all, as usual when dealing with inequality in a panel dimension, 
gathering the information needed for the dataset is a challenging task. Our dataset 
covers 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2007. Compared with B&M’s study, 
we therefore have more cross-country observations1 but a shorter time dimension. This 
assures higher comparability/homogeneity of data and better availability of explanatory 
variables, while allowing us to focus on the period in which income inequality, deregula-
tion and household indebtedness rose in tandem across much of the developed world. 
This entails giving up a longer-run perspective, which, however, (i) would have been 
based on fragmentary and heterogeneous empirical materials and (ii) would not have 
been able to consider the role of major institutional changes on the side of financial 
markets (which B&M ignore) due to lack of data before the 1970s.
1 To the 14 countries considered by Bordo and Meissner (2012) (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA), we add 
Portugal, Finland, Ireland and New Zealand.
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A second major point to be clarified and dealt with in Section 3.1 is that a credit 
expansion, although regularly preceding and determining the conditions of a financial 
crisis, is not per se necessarily negative for the economy when it is driven by factors 
related to the real economy or to the normal development of macroeconomic aggre-
gates. For this reason we need to analyse the relationships of interest in the framework 
of a more general model of credit drivers, derived on the basis of the relevant literature. 
A third group of problems that need to be addressed, dealt with in Section 3.3, relates to 
the complexity of the relationships among the variables considered, which are far from 
being univocally determined. On the one side, a typical problem of endogeneity related 
to potential reverse causality exists between credit growth and the factors employed as 
its drivers. On the other side, the explanatory variables of main interest here might not 
be independent of each other. Rather, a causal link has been hypothesised both from 
inequality to deregulation (as in Rajan’s explanations) and vice versa (as in Acemoglu’s 
view); similarly, rising inequality could drive monetary policy (Stiglitz’s hypothesis), 
which also needs to be included in the set of regressors. All these aspects are accounted 
for by proper econometric treatments, namely by means of instrumental variable (IV) 
approaches. On the descriptive side, the direction of causality has been preliminarily 
tested using a Granger analysis (Granger, 1969).
The remainder of this section goes on to discuss the data (Section 3.1) before pre-
senting some preliminary descriptive evidence (Section 3.2), the econometric methods 
(Section 3.3) and our findings (Section 3.4).
3.1 Data and variables
The measure of credit that we use in all our specifications is the level of domestic credit 
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, from the World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank, 2012). This indicator is used as the dependent variable in the 
estimation of the effects of inequality and deregulation of financial markets on credit 
expansion (see Section 3.3). The same variable is also used as a predictor of financial 
crises in the preliminary descriptive exercise carried out in Section 3.2. The indicator 
includes credit to individuals and enterprises from banks and other financial corpora-
tions, which, according to the definition of the variable provided in the World Development 
Indicators, include finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corpora-
tions, pension funds and foreign exchange companies. This is in contrast to B&M, who 
use the log of real bank loans to the private sector. As maintained by Elekdag and 
Wu (2011), a credit aggregate that also includes credit extended by non-deposit-taking 
institutions is preferable, as credit booms can arise owing to funds provided by these 
agents, especially in periods of high rates of financial innovation and deregulation, as in 
the one under scrutiny here. Our choice to look at the amount of total credit (as a per-
centage of GDP) in levels, rather than in terms of changes (as in B&M), is motivated by 
the fact that all the literature emphasises how it is excessive levels of credit in an economy 
that leads to financial crisis, not necessarily the rate at which it grows: whether higher 
rates of credit growth lead to a financial crisis depends on the initial level of credit avail-
able in the economy, since the same growth rate might translate into very different levels 
of credit and risk. Also, increasing levels of credit do not necessarily lead to instability 
per se: other things being equal, credit growth accompanied by similar income/produc-
tivity growth need not entail increased macroeconomic risk; similarly, unchanged debt 
levels may involve increased macroeconomic risk if income/productivity is falling. This 
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is another benefit of using credit as a percentage of GDP (and we also control for per 
capita GDP, as discussed below).
There is one important limitation, common to both of the credit measures discussed 
above. This is the fact that they comprise household debt (in which we are interested) 
and the debt of businesses and other private organisations. Unfortunately, comparable 
measures of household debt/credit exclusively are not available for the time and geo-
graphical coverage of our study. To overcome this, as per B&M, a measure of gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP is also included in all regressions to account 
for credit extended to the non-household private sector. Despite considering this vari-
able a reasonably reliable proxy for the most part of credit demanded by firms for 
investment purposes, we are aware of its imperfection; for example, retained profits can 
also be used for investment financing. Unfortunately, a variable that allows us to control 
for this source of financing more specifically is not available for the countries and time 
period covered here. The inclusion of GDP growth also serves as an additional control 
for credit demand for firms’ investment purposes, driven by expectations on future lev-
els of aggregate demand. Lastly, a similar role is played by the inclusion of a measure of 
portfolio investment (as a percentage of GDP), in order to control for credit demand 
driven by transactions in equity and debt securities.
As a proxy for income concentration and inequality more generally, we follow B&M 
in using the share of total income going to the top 1% of earners, from the World Top 
Incomes Database. Robustness checks are then implemented using the top 5% and the 
top 10% shares. These data have been obtained from historical income tax records 
by several different teams of researchers following the methodology of Piketty (2001). 
Observation units are individuals, households or tax units and income includes labour, 
business and capital income (in some cases also realised capital gains). As a result there 
are some cross-country comparability issues (although small), which may also happen 
over time due to changes in tax legislation (see Atkinson et al., 2011). Another con-
ceptual shortcoming of this indicator is that the income concept is market income (i.e. 
pre-tax and transfers), whereas in this context it would be preferable to use disposable 
income, which bears more significantly on household/individual consumption, invest-
ment and borrowing decisions. However, this indicator provides an excellent insight 
into income concentration at the top of the distribution and it is particularly suitable 
to represent the side of inequality we consider important here, related to the ideas of 
relative income and consumption cascade effects as drivers of credit expansion. By its 
own nature, it offers little information as to what is happening at the bottom of the 
distribution. However, the shortcoming of offering a partial view on the distribution is 
common to all measures of inequality and empirical evidence shows top income shares 
to be strongly correlated with broader inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient 
(see, e.g., Leigh, 2007). Lastly, these indicators also guarantee greater coverage and 
comparability across countries and over time as well as consistency vis-à-vis the existing 
inequality–crisis literature (Bordo and Meissner, 2012; Kumhof et al., 2012).
The third key variable of our analysis is the indicator of credit market (de)regula-
tion (code 5A) supplied by the Fraser Institute in the Economic Freedom of the World 
database (Gwartney et  al., 2010). The measure, ranging from 0 to 10 in ascending 
order of deregulation, is a summary indicator of four dimensions related to the fol-
lowing: (i) ownership of banks; (ii) foreign bank competition; (iii) private sector credit; 
and (iv) interest rate controls/negative interest rates. The summary indicators has been 
extensively used in the existing empirical literature (see, e.g., Giannone et al., 2011; 
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Dawson, 2006; Stankov, 2012); the alternative credit market regulation index by Abiad 
et al. (2008), also widely employed (see, e.g., Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Azzimonti 
et al., 2012), is more limited over time (1973–2005) and would remarkably reduce the 
number of observations, especially in the most recent years, which are of great inter-
est here. An extensive literature has emphasised that deregulation of financial markets 
triggers credit expansion, for example due to increased aggregate supply of financial 
instruments and credit (Bordo and Meissner, 2012), the consequences of increased 
competition (Gosh, 2010; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006), the emergence of implicit 
guarantees (Gourinchas et al., 2001; Corsetti et al., 1999) and the increase in opportun-
istic behaviours by bankers (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998).
As already mentioned, also on the basis of the existing literature, we include among 
the regressors a measure of portfolio investments (as a percentage of GDP) to control 
for credit demand driven by transactions in equity and debt securities, including exter-
nal liabilities (except those constituting foreign authorities’ reserves). This variable also 
accounts for financial capital inflows usually considered in the literature as related to 
credit growth (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Elekdag and Wu, 2011). An alternative 
variable for this purpose would have been a measure of the current account balance (as 
a percentage of GDP), but when employed in our estimates this did not show itself to 
be significant and so was excluded for the sake of model parsimony. Two other variables, 
the real interest rate (lending rate adjusted by the GDP deflator) and the broad money 
supply (M2-to-GDP ratio), act as proxies for the monetary policy environment.2 As 
emphasised by Elekdag and Wu (2011, p. 9), the interest rate alone may not be able to 
accurately represent the level of global liquidity at all times, especially more recently due 
to non-conventional monetary policies. The use of a lending rate (in the place of a policy 
rate) allows for the complexity of institutional arrangements in the financial markets that 
shape cross-country differences in interest rate pass-through effects (see, e.g., European 
Central Bank, 2009; Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). In the use of a broad concept of 
money supply, we follow Schularick and Taylor (2012). All the variables just described 
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Many studies find that the overall level of economic development, measured by per 
capita income or income growth measures, is the strongest predictor of financial pro-
gress and credit availability (see, e.g., Adarov and Tchaidze, 2011 and the many refer-
ences cited therein). We therefore include among the regressors the level of real per 
capita GDP and the annual GDP growth rate (both from Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy: 1-2008 AD, copyright Angus Maddison), which also act as further controls 
for the procyclicality of credit (Borio et  al., 2001). Strictly speaking, this is already 
accounted for by standardising the amount of credit to GDP ratio; however, as empha-
sised by Mendoza and Terrones (2008), this measure can ambiguously represent credit 
expansion, since its growth might be simply due to a GDP decline, with credit being 
constant. Including controls for GDP level and growth contributes to address this issue.
It is worth remembering that in studies with such an extensive time and geographi-
cal coverage, the use of second-best variables is the norm, due to scanty availability of 
consistent and ‘ideal’ information over time and space. This caveat should always be 
kept in mind when interpreting and generalising the outcomes obtained. Fortunately, as 
2 An alternative, indirect approach was to include variables emphasising the role of monetary stabilisa-
tion programmes, such as the rate of inflation or a real exchange rate (Gourinchas et al., 2001). These two 
variables, included in the model, did not show significance and were excluded due to the multicollinearity 
problems they generated.
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explained extensively later, proper econometric methods allow us to effectively address 
these issues. In particular, the panel data estimation techniques used here, by means of 
fixed country and time effects, allow us to control for unobserved and imperfectly meas-
ured factors specific to countries and years, rendering the estimation of the coefficients 
of core interest reasonably reliable.
3.2 Preliminary and descriptive evidence
As a preliminary step prior to the main empirical model, we provide evidence on the 
link between credit expansion and periods of financial crisis. Although credit expan-
sion might be due to financial deepening shown to support growth (Levine, 2005) or 
normal cyclical upswings, credit booms are typically associated with growing financial 
imbalances and tend to end abruptly, often in the form of financial crises (Elekdag and 
Wu, 2011). As emphasised in the previous sections, an extensive literature agrees on the 
existence of this relationship, which is largely confirmed empirically. Following Bordo 
and Meissner (2012) and Schularick and Taylor (2012), we explore whether this rela-
tionship also exists in our database by estimating the probability of a banking crisis as a 
function of credit available in the economy, in the following form:
 Pr , , ,bankingcrisis f Credi t i t i t i t( ) = + + +( )α τ ε  (1)
where subscripts i and t refer to countries and years, respectively (i = 1, …, 18; t = 1970, 
…, 2010); αi and τt are the country- and the time-specific effects and εi,t is an idiosyn-
cratic error term for each country and each period. The dependent variable is coded as 
a binary indicator equal to 1 when a banking crisis occurred according to Laeven and 
Valencia (2013) and 0 otherwise. The use of binary variables is customary in this kind of 
estimation and is due to poor availability (over time and space) of continuous variables 
able to properly describe a financial/banking crisis. Also, the expansion of a financial 
aggregate (e.g. stock exchange or liquidity) does not necessarily lead to a crisis. Laeven 
and Valencia (2013) define a banking crisis as an event that meets two conditions: (i) 
significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant 
bank runs, losses in the banking system and/or bank liquidations); and (ii) significant 
banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking 
system. This definition and other methodological aspects, including various robustness 
checks, detailed in the paper assure high reliability of the information included in the 
database.
The explanatory variable Cred is the amount of credit to GDP ratio as described in 
the previous sections. Results presented in Table 1 confirm the existence of a strong, 
positive, statistically significant and robust relationship between the amount of credit 
available as a percentage of GDP, and the probability of a banking crisis.
The plots reported in Figure 1 support the existence of the relationship for a selec-
tion of countries in which the link is particularly clear-cut (the dotted vertical lines 
identify banking crises). Overall, this empirical evidence indicates that, as done in the 
antecedent literature, we can now focus on the fundamental drivers of credit expansion, 
particularly those of interest to us.
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical 
model, showing that they provide substantial levels of variability. As expected, data 
availability on inequality poses the most severe constraint to the analysis. (see Table 3) A 
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simple correlation analysis shows preliminary support for the existence of a remarkably 
strong link between credit expansion and the remaining variables, especially inequality, 
monetary policy and per capita GDP.
The relationship between broad money supply and the interest rate, although nega-
tive and statistically significant, is low, confirming the inability of the interest rate 
alone to properly depict the monetary policy environment (Elekdag and Wu, 2011). 
Figure 2, which plots the yearly average of credit to GDP ratio, inequality and financial 
Table 1. Banking crisis and credit, 1970–2010
Dependent variable:
banking crisis
Logit; RE (1) Logit; RE (2) Logit; FE (3) Logit; FE (4)
cred_GDP 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.046***
(7.12) (3.80) (7.42) (3.86)
Constant −6.489*** −28.714 – –
(−8.80) (−0.00) – –
Time dummies No Yes No Yes
Wald test (RE)/LR test (FE) 50.73*** – 103.80*** 213.27***
N observations 719 719 599 599
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when a banking crisis occurred according to Laeven 
and Valencia (2013).
Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets.
*p<0.10, **p<0.5 and ***p<0.01.
Fig. 1. Private credit to GDP ratio and crises: select countries, 1970–2010.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. Observations
cred_GDP 87.266 44.339 12.767 227.753 670
Ineq (top 1%) 7.576 2.466 3.490 18.290 531
Dereg (cred mkt) 8.231 1.151 4.422 10.000 684
cap_form_gdp 22.567 3.963 15.312 36.372 673
portf_inv_gdp −4.335 67.516 −575.262 598.181 661
M2_gdp 85.751 43.493 18.589 238.975 683
real_int_rate 4.240 3.963 −13.184 19.259 676
Real_gdp_growth 0.027 0.022 −0.076 0.110 684
pc_gdp (ln) 9.664 0.311 8.608 10.353 684
Fig. 2. Private credit, inequality and financial deregulation (mean of 18 OECD countries 
1970–2007).
Table 3. Correlation analysis
cred_ 
GDP
Ineq 
(top1)
Dereg  
(cred mkt)
cap_form_
gdp
portf_inv_
gdp
M2_gdp real_int_
rate
pc_gdp 
(ln)
Real_gdp_
growth
cred_GDP 1
Ineq (top1) 0.503* 1
Dereg (cred mkt) 0.269* 0.182* 1
cap_form_gdp −0.110* −0.229* −0.369* 1
portf_inv_gdp −0.078* 0.060 −0.046 0.091* 1
M2_gdp 0.693* 0.290* −0.079* 0.073* −0.032 1
real_int_rate −0.162* −0.109* 0.226* −0.197* 0.139* −0.187* 1
pc_gdp (ln) 0.583* 0.374* 0.578* −0.383* −0.175* 0.179* 0.170* 1
real_gdp_growth −0.161* 0.034 −0.012 0.035 −0.009 −0.089* −0.150* −0.215* 1
*Significant at the 1% level or better.
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deregulation for the 18 countries of our sample, also provides preliminary support to 
the idea of co-movement between the variables of key interest here.
This particularly holds after the turbulent 1970s, following which all three indica-
tors rose sharply during the 1980s before stabilising somewhat in the early half of the 
1990s and then growing together once more from the mid-1990s onwards. The rela-
tionship between inequality and credit is particularly strong and straightforward for 
some countries of great interest due to their macroeconomic and financial histories, as 
illustrated in the diagrams in Figure 3.
Data in Table 3 also reveal that the correlation among the remaining variables used in 
our empirical model as drivers of credit growth is relatively low. In particular, the weak 
links between inequality, credit market deregulation and monetary policy variables are 
of interest here, since they are related to interpretative frameworks emphasising the role 
of political economy mechanisms (e.g. the hypotheses of Rajan, Stiglitz and Acemoglu). 
The results of the Granger causality analysis (Granger, 1969), although not conclusive 
due to their own nature and limitations,3 provide evidence of independence of these vari-
ables (Table 4). In each of the tests, the null hypothesis (H0) of deregulation not Granger-
causing inequality (as per Acemoglu’s conjecture), or of inequality not Granger-causing 
deregulation (Rajan) and monetary expansion (Stiglitz), cannot be rejected.
Fig. 3. Private credit to GDP ratio and inequality: select countries, 1970–2010.
3 The Granger causality test is a statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time series is use-
ful in forecasting another, since causality could be reflected by measuring the ability to predict the future 
values of a time series using past values of another time series (Granger, 1969). Under such a concept of 
causality, a time series A is said to Granger-cause B if it can be shown, by means of F-tests on lagged values 
of A (and with lagged values of B also included), that those A values provide statistically significant informa-
tion about future values of B.
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Table 4. Granger causality tests (deregulation/inequality and monetary policy/inequality)
H0:
Dereg_cred_mkt does  
not Granger-cause  
Ineq (top 1%)
H0:
Ineq (top 1%) does 
not Granger-cause 
Dereg_cred_mkt
H0:
Ineq (top 1%) does 
not Granger-cause 
M2_gdp
F-statistic (p-value) F-statistic 
(p-value)
N obs F-statistic 
(p-value)
N obs
1 lag 1.467 (0.226) 0.981 (0.322) 487 1.387 (0.238) 489
2 lags 2.794 (0.062) 1.570 (0.209) 468 0.487 (0.615) 470
3 lags 1.977 (0.116) 1.514 (0.210) 449 0.407 (0.748) 451
4 lags 1.346 (0.251) 1.194 (0.313) 430 0.341 (0.850) 432
5 lags 1.591 (0.161) 1.802 (0.111) 411 0.230 (0.949) 413
3.3 Econometric methods and the empirical model
In order to assess the impact of inequality and deregulation on credit expansion, we 
consider the following dynamic model:
 
Cred = + + Cred + Ineq + +
i,t i t i,t -1 1 i,t 2 i,t
α τ γ β β βDereg (cred mkt)
3
4 i,t 5 i,t 6 i,t 7
i,t
+ Port_Inv + M2 + Int_rate + GDP_gr
Cap_form
β β β β
i,t 8 i,t
+ PCgdp+β ε  (2)
where subscripts i and t refer to countries and years, respectively (i = 1, …, 18; t = 1970, 
…, 2007); αi and τt are the country- and the time-specific effects and εi,t the error terms. 
The acronyms indicate the variables as described in the previous sections. Obviously, 
the inclusion of country- and time-specific effects is a major advantage of the panel 
approach, providing controls for unobservable or imperfectly measured drivers of 
credit, such as global liquidity conditions or foreign capital inflows. Equation (2) is 
then further extended by introducing an interaction variable obtained by multiplying 
the indicators of inequality and credit market deregulation, in order to test the possibil-
ity that the effect of inequality on credit growth might be enhanced or exist only under 
laxer regulatory frameworks.
The dynamic specification of equation (2) accounts for the fact that the level of 
credit to GDP ratio is characterised by high within-country inertia and can be viewed 
as a time-persistent phenomenon. Not including the lagged dependent variable among 
the regressors (when significant) would affect the estimation outcomes due to omitted 
variable bias. In addition, as previously mentioned, equation (2) can be characterised 
by the presence of other endogenous regressors and reverse causality issues. A  large 
body of literature has analysed the effects of credit on inequality, emphasising how the 
possibility of undertaking investments in physical and especially human capital may be 
hampered by the existence of credit constraints (Li et al., 1998), credit market imper-
fections (Galor and Zeira, 1993) and poorly developed financial markets (Greenwood 
and Jovanovic, 1990). Similar concerns of inverse direction of causality may arise 
between the size of credit in the economy and the extent of investments, consumption 
and ultimately aggregate demand (see, e.g., Elekdag and Wu, 2011) and with reference 
to growth and development driven by financial deepening and increased levels of inter-
mediation (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Decressin and Terrones, 2011).
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Dealing with all these issues simultaneously is a challenging task. Our choice here 
is to use different approaches able to address some or all of the problems mentioned 
and to compare the outcomes, particularly the relationships of interest, step by step. 
As a first pass, we estimate a standard fixed-effects (FE) model, as in Bordo and 
Meissner (2012), but employing a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) model, 
which allows correction for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of errors (which 
need to be addressed in our estimates) and provides more reliable standard errors 
(Beck and Katz, 1995). However, the presence of the lagged dependent variable, due 
to its potential correlation with the composite error ( ),α εi i t+ , may lead to inconsist-
ent parameter estimates also when country heterogeneity is accounted for by means 
of conventional fixed- or random-effects (RE) estimators (Baltagi, 2001). This is due 
to the so-called dynamic panel bias—although if T (the time dimension) is sufficiently 
large, this becomes insignificant. Under such circumstances, a standard, straightfor-
ward fixed-effects estimator can be employed (Roodman, 2009). Yet this approach 
fails to address the problems of endogeneity due to potential reverse causality. To 
deal with this issue, we adopt two different approaches. The first relies on a fixed-
effects instrumental variable estimator based on Hansen’s (1982) original general-
ised method of moments (GMM), which allows the instrumentation of variables at 
risk of endogeneity as well as providing standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. As instruments, we use a mix of internal (up to two lags) and 
external variables derived from the literature (see the beginning of Section 2)  that 
are expected to impact on inequality, investment and growth and to be uncorrelated 
with the dependent variable (credit as a percentage of GDP). In particular, in order 
to account for the labour and product market institutional settings expected to impact 
on inequality, we employed as instruments variables derived again from the Fraser 
Institute database, namely: (i) indicator 5b (labour market regulation), which includes 
information on hiring regulations for temporary workers and minimum wage, hiring 
and firing regulations, centralised collective bargaining, hours regulation, conscrip-
tion and mandated costs of dismissal; and (ii) indicator 5c (business regulations), with 
information on price controls, administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, time 
and money required to start a business, extra payments/bribes/favouritism, licensing 
restrictions and cost of tax compliance. To control for the aspects related to globalisa-
tion of markets, particularly on the relative demand for skills and hence on relative 
wages, we used the basic indicator of foreign trade openness and economic integra-
tion (total trade-to-GDP ratio) available in the World Development Indicators database. 
The validity of the instruments is tested by means of the standard tests reported at the 
bottom of  Tables 5, 6 and A1.
As a check for the robustness of the results obtained, we also approach the endoge-
neity issue using the System GMM estimation techniques (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). The GMM-Sys estimator uses as instruments the lagged 
values of the endogenous explanatory variables. Variables in levels are instrumented 
with lagged first differences; then, in order to consider these additional moments as 
valid instruments for levels, the identifying assumption that past changes of the explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated with current errors in levels, which include fixed effects, 
is required (Roodman, 2009). The validity of the moment conditions can be tested by 
means of the test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958) and Hansen 
(1982) and by testing the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the 
error term.
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The GMM-Sys estimator has the advantage of allowing instrumentation of endog-
enous variables with internal lags; however, it is designed for large N, small T panels 
to deal efficiently with dynamic panel bias. Its employment in dataset like the current 
one (large T, small N) may cause a natural proliferation of the number of instruments 
(Roodman, 2009; Bowsher, 2002). However, System GMM estimation allows some 
flexibility by means of several specification choices. In particular, given the structure of 
our panel, we use the one-step estimator and correct the standard errors to account for 
small-sample bias and heteroscedasticity by applying the Huber–White robust variance 
estimator. Furthermore, to address the problem of instrument proliferation, we use a 
combined strategy obtained by collapsing instruments (i.e. creating one instrument 
for each variable and lag distance only, with 0 substituted for any missing values) and 
restricting the number of lags used as instruments.
3.4 Results
Table 5 reports the estimates of our empirical model, which firstly highlight an overall 
stability across the alternative econometric approaches. The coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is always positive and significant, confirming the validity and the 
necessity of a dynamic specification. Conceptually, this evidence can be explained not 
only with the obvious effects of borrowing decisions made years before, but also in terms 
of herd behaviour, as explained by Rajan (1994). The fact that others are lending may 
be considered valuable information concerning the creditworthiness of a potential bor-
rower. More importantly, performance being generally assessed relative to some market 
benchmark, managers from financial institutions have a strong incentive to behave as 
their peers, providing inertia to credit expansion over time (Gosh, 2010).
As for the other control variables, capital formation emerges as positively related to 
credit, confirming the long and extensive literature arguing that capital investments 
(especially those driven by technological breakthroughs and displacement) need to be 
financed with credit (Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1986). Also, as expected, larger money avail-
ability (M2-to-GDP ratio) drives credit expansion (Elekdag and Han, 2012; Elekdag 
and Wu, 2011); similarly, more advanced levels of development (per capita GDP) are 
positively associated with higher credit. The size of portfolio investments, which also 
include external liabilities and should control for capital inflows, is either not significant 
or negative, indicating, as per Mendoza and Terrones (2008), that credit expansion is 
lower in the presence of large outflows of portfolio investments. The remaining control 
variables (real interest rate and GDP growth) are not significant. All results are robust 
to the adoption of IV approaches, which allows for potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables.
In all specifications the proxy for financial market liberalisation is found to have a 
positive, statistically significant (at a more than 99% confidence level) effect on private 
sector credit, firmly justifying its inclusion in the model and indicating that its exclu-
sion would certainly lead to omitted variable bias. This evidence is consistent with the 
conceptual explanations provided by the literature (see, e.g., Gosh, 2010; Dell’Ariccia 
and Marquez, 2006; Gourinchas et al., 2001) and well-established empirical findings 
(see, e.g., Mendoza and Terrones, 2008).
As far as the focus of our analysis is concerned, the coefficient of the inequality varia-
ble (top 1%) is positive and significant in all estimates, suggesting that higher inequality 
directly (i.e. without any intermediate mechanism) drives higher credit, once its con-
ventional determinants are controlled for. This is in line with the reasoning of Kumhof 
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and Rancière (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2012), which we developed in terms of relative 
income (Duesenberry, 1949; Barba and Pivetti, 2009) and expenditure cascade (Frank 
et al., 2010) hypotheses. Therefore we found clear cross-country evidence that inequal-
ity can directly impact on credit expansion.
Generally speaking, a major concern when studying the effects of inequality is the 
dependence of outcomes on the specific measure of inequality employed (Litchfield, 
1999). In order to assess the robustness of the effects of inequality on the size of credit, 
we carried out additional estimations using the income share held by the top 5% and 
top 10% of the distribution. The results are reported in Table 6 and confirm that higher 
inequality triggers higher credit-to-income ratios; similarly, the signs and significance of 
the remaining variables remain virtually unchanged.
Although the literature explored here envisages direct and independent relationships 
between credit expansion and inequality on the one side and financial deregulation on 
the other, other recent contributions tend to hypothesise a joint, self-reinforcing inter-
action effect. Tridico (2012), for example, states that the rise of inequality generated on 
the labour market led to an increased demand of credit, which translated into a credit 
expansion due to the increase of supply fed by lax monetary policies and financial 
deregulation. This would suggest that the effect of inequality on credit expansion should 
be magnified by deregulation. Translated into empirical terms, the interaction term 
between the metric of inequality and deregulation should be positive and significant in 
the estimates. Estimation of the models with the inclusion of this interaction effect (col-
umns 1–3 of Table A1 in the Appendix) does not provide support to the possibility that 
inequality may further foster credit expansion in the presence of less regulated institu-
tional settings. On the contrary, the interaction terms render the main effects insignifi-
cant: they do not add any information to the model, while producing only disturbance 
due to redundant information. In columns 4–6 of Table A1, we test the possibility that 
this effect might be confined only to countries with very high levels of deregulation. To 
this aim, the interaction term is generated by multiplying the inequality indicator and a 
dummy variable that is 1 if the corresponding level of deregulation is in the top decile of 
its distribution and 0 otherwise. This sorts out the issues of multicollinearity (the main 
effects regain significance), but the coefficient of the interaction term is again not statis-
tically different from zero. This means that while there is a direct effect of inequality on 
credit (and of deregulation on credit), it is not magnified by deregulation. Therefore it 
seems that the two effects acted separately on credit expansion, without self-reinforcing 
patterns.
4. Discussion and final remarks
The principle aim of this research was to provide new evidence on the relationship 
between the distribution of income and financial stability. Whilst the existing literature 
offers a number of diverse theoretical explanations as to how the former might impact 
on the latter, they all have in common the notion that widening income inequality 
impacts negatively on household balance sheets. Accordingly, the primary focus of our 
empirical investigation was to test whether a causal link exists between widening ine-
quality and household indebtedness. This was done via econometric analysis employ-
ing a panel of data from 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2007, the findings 
of which support the existence of a positive relationship between the proportion of 
national income accruing to the top percentiles of the income distribution and the ratio 
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of private sector credit to GDP ratio. In a secondary exercise, the latter is found to be a 
significant predictor of systemic financial risk within our sample.
Our findings contrast with those of the preceding literature, in particular those 
reported by Bordo and Meissner (2012), who concluded against an income inequality–
debt nexus and whose research served as an inspiration for our own. Our findings sug-
gest that this evidence can be considered far from conclusive. However, a few important 
features of the methodology employed here set our research apart.
First, our methodology focuses on the effects of the level of income inequality on 
the level of indebtedness (and hence financial risk) whereas B&M focus on changes in 
these variables. Their findings are thus silent on the effects of absolute levels of income 
inequality and debt; yet, for reasons stated above, a focus on levels is conceptually supe-
rior given the relationships under investigation.
Second, our methodology takes account of a key institutional determinant of credit 
availability—which is emphasised in the literature on credit booms, but which B&M 
ignore entirely—namely the extent to which credit markets are regulated. We find this 
to be a highly significant predictor of credit (as a percentage of GDP) and its omission 
would undoubtedly bias the results of any such an analysis. Furthermore, we argue that 
the credit measure we use as the dependent variable in our empirical model is more 
appropriate where financial fragility is concerned (e.g. it includes lending to the pri-
vate sector from non-bank financial institutions—an increasingly large source of credit 
in most advanced economies—which is not accounted for in the bank credit variable 
employed by B&M).
Finally, we employ econometric methods that enable us to control for issues relat-
ing to possible endogeneity and interdependence of the explanatory variables in our 
empirical model identified in the credit literature, which B&M make no attempt to 
account for.
As a result of the above methodological differences, we argue that the findings pre-
sented here more accurately reflect the true nature of the inequality–debt–crisis relation-
ship; therefore the existence of a relationship between inequality and credit expansion 
(and therefore crisis) cannot be ruled out.
We are aware of the limitations of the results obtained in such a methodological frame-
work, which does not allow us to model explicitly (but only to account for) specific his-
torical and social factors. Further analyses dealing with these aspects, under a different 
methodological perspective, are therefore needed to complement our evidence. In terms 
of framing our findings in the context of the current theoretical debate over the inequal-
ity–debt transmission mechanism, our findings, if confirmed, support the notion of a direct 
causal link between income inequality and indebtedness. This would be consistent with the 
models of Kumhof and Rancière (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2012) and in line with theories 
of consumer behaviour based on the relative income hypothesis (Duesenberry, 1949) and 
expenditure cascades (Frank et al., 2010). With regard to Rajan’s hypothesis of widening 
income inequality in the USA leading to increased pressure to deregulate financial mar-
kets, we find no empirical evidence of this mechanism on a cross-country basis. In fact our 
findings suggest that income inequality drives private sector indebtedness irrespective of 
the level of financial regulation (and vice versa). Nor do we find empirical support for the 
notion that rising inequality prompts looser monetary policy (as per Stiglitz, 2012; Fitoussi 
and Saraceno, 2011). Having said all of this, these explanations would benefit from further 
investigation since, as emphasised by Van Treek (2014), they may be complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive.
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The implications of a direct causal relationship link between income inequality and 
debt and thus systemic financial risk, if confirmed, would not be small. For the eco-
nomics profession, the view that the distribution of permanent income is irrelevant to 
macroeconomic outcomes (the conventional wisdom in mainstream economics in the 
decades preceding the crisis) at the very least needs review. This ideology has its foun-
dations in permanent-income and life-cycle hypotheses of consumer behaviour, which 
have long sat uncomfortably with real-world data. These foundations are increasingly 
shown to be shaky, putting the entire edifice at risk. We join others in arguing for a 
renaissance of the relative income hypothesis, which has the potential to offer greater 
insights into real-world consumer behaviour. For policy makers wishing to make the 
financial system more robust, the evidence presented here suggests that they may need 
to cast the net wider than regulatory reforms and monetary policy and consider the 
impact of the distribution of income on household indebtedness.
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